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Abstract
This article provides an update of the Theory of Event Coding (TEC), which claims that perception and action are identical
processes operating on the same codes – event files consisting of integrated networks of sensorimotor feature codes. The original
version of the theory emphasized its representational underpinnings, but recent theoretical developments provide the basis for a
more integrated view consisting of both the codes that are shared between perception and action in the control processes operating
on these codes. Four developments are discussed in more detail: The degree to which the integration and retrieval of event files
depends on current goals, howmetacontrol states impact the handling of event files, how feature binding relates to event learning,
and how the integration of non-social events relates to the integration of social events. Case examples using various versions of
the Simon task are used to explain how the new version of TEC explains interactions between perception and action in non-social
and social situations.
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Introduction
The exact starting points of research agendas are notoriously
difficult to determine, but it is fair to say that the 1960s were
particularly important for the systematic experimental investi-
gation of interactions between perception and action. To a
substantial degree, research during that period was driven by
applied interests in the construction and evaluation of ergo-
nomic man-machine interfaces. Workers often had to respond
to visual signals indicating the presence of some important
state of affairs, such as the fuel level of a particular apparatus,
by performing appropriate actions, such as initiating a refuel,
and the question was how the signal should be presented in
order to optimize the speed and accuracy of the response.
Experiments were often theory-free and mainly played
through various combinations of stimulus displays and re-
sponse handles to determine the combination working best
(e.g., Loveless, 1962). It quickly turned out that performance
benefited from various kinds of feature overlap between stim-
ulus display and response handle – an observation that was
also made in various laboratory tasks, such as with the Stroop
or the Simon task.
Unfortunately, however, the preferred kind of theorizing in
the 1960s and 1970s provided only limited insight into the
underlying cognitive principles. According to the dominating
Sternberg logic at that time, a good cognitive theory was sup-
posed to identify the processes that are relevant in producing a
particular experimental effect and determine their ordering in
time by assessing the temporal demands of the respective
processes and their sensitivity to particular experimental ma-
nipulations (Sternberg, 1969). Applying this logic revealed
that the effect of feature overlap between stimulus and re-
sponse mainly affected the stage of response selection, in the
sense that feature overlap reduces the time needed to select a
response. Why that might be the case remained a mystery. For
instance, one of the most comprehensive models to account
for effects of stimulus-response feature overlap, the
Dimensional Overlap Model of Kornblum, Hasbroucq, and
Osman (1990), claimed that such feature overlap would auto-
matically activate the respective response, which would be
beneficial if this response is correct but impair performance
if it is not. Given the process-oriented nature of the approach,
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it failed to explain how and why a stimulus would tend to
activate feature-overlapping responses in the first place or
which features of the response would be sensitive to overlap.
It simply assumed that overlap is sufficient for automatic ac-
tivation, which – given that evidence for the automatic activa-
tion of feature-overlapping responses was the explanandum
the theory sought to explain – provided little more than a
rewording of the original observation.
It was the limited scope of process-oriented approaches and
their limited interest in truly mechanistic explanations of in-
teractions between perception and action that motivated my
colleagues and me to develop the Theory of Event Coding
(TEC; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001a).
We felt that theorizing about processes without considering
the codes on which such processes are operating, their format
and origin, and their functional role in representing and pro-
cessing perceived and produced events, is unlikely to generate
deeper insights into the connection between perception and
action. As a result of this dissatisfaction with purely process-
oriented boxologies, TEC was very heavy on the representa-
tional side while making only a few assumptions with respect
to processes. In particular, the original version of TEC did not
provide much information about how the hypothesized repre-
sentational codes interact with control processes, which was
criticized by various commentators of the original target arti-
cle and acknowledged in our reply (Hommel et al., 2001b;
R2.7). To address this shortcoming, the recent developments
of TEC were mainly aimed to integrate the representational
assumptions with a functional control structure, i.e., to make
derivations and predictions more specific and better testable,
but also to further broaden the scope of the theory. It is these
recent developments that I would like to focus on here, after
having briefly presented the main assumptions of the original
TEC (for broader theoretical justification and empirical basis I
refer the interested reader to Hommel et al., 2001a, and
Hommel, 2009, 2015a, 2016), which the new version leaves
fully intact. In particular, I discuss how event coding is affect-
ed by control and metacontrol states and processes, how fea-
ture integration/binding relates to learning, and how the theory
might be extended to social events. To provide a more detailed
insight into how representational and control processes might
be integrated, I then apply old and new theoretical develop-
ments to experimental effects, where I take variants of the
well-known Simon task as a case example, before concluding
with a few desiderata.
The Theory of Event Coding V1.0
General assumptions
TEC relies on three general and five more specific assump-
tions. In general terms, the theory assumes that (a) perceptions
and action goals are coded in the same way (common coding),
(b) through distributed feature codes, which (c) refer to the
distal features of the represented event. The first of these as-
sumptions derives from the ideomotor heritage of TEC.
Ideomotor approaches intend to explain how people are able
to perform goal-directed movements without having direct
conscious access to or any conscious knowledge about their
own motor system (Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010; Stock &
Stock, 2004). The ideomotor principle that is thought to pro-
vide this explanation claims that carrying out movements is
accompanied by a learning process that integrates the motor
patterns driving the movement with the sensory information
that the movement generates, such as the proprioceptive ex-
perience of moving and the visual changes of hand position, or
the kinesthetic and auditory effects of touching a piano key.
Note that part of the integrated re-afferent information refers
to the movement itself, i.e., the bodily experience, while an-
other part refers to the way the movement changes the envi-
ronment. The integration of motor patterns and codes of re-
afferent action effects renders the latter effective primes of the
former, so that an agent can simply reactivate the action-effect
codes (a process that different approaches have considered to
consist of Bthinking of,^ Bimagining,^ or Bsimulating^ partic-
ular action outcomes), which then tend to reactivate the motor
patterns they are integrated with. It is through these action-
effect codes that people gain access to their motor system, so
that actions can be considered to be represented by codes of
the sensory effects they have been experienced to produce.
Note that the active use of such past knowledge for the control
of future action can be taken to turn the knowledge into a
prediction (or at least some kind of expectation that the previ-
ously produced action effect will again be produced by carry-
ing out the action), which renders the ideomotor approach
functionally equivalent to present predictive-coding models
(Kilner et al., 2015).
The idea that actions are represented by codes of their per-
ceptual effects begs the question in which sense perception
and action actually differ in nature. Outside the psychological
laboratory, perceived events are commonly actively produced
by performing particular movements. This is obvious for
touch, which requires the systematic movement of touch sen-
sors across a surface with to-be-identified features, but holds
for all sensory modalities, as we for instance foveate objects
only because we have moved our body close to and directed
our eyes at them. Hence, almost all perceptions can be con-
sidered effects of some preceding action, and the resulting
percept often considers the characteristics of this action, as
for instance the direction in which the eyes were moved in
order to foveate the object – which determines the object’s
location. If so, perception and action can be considered two
processes that are not just related or interconnected but actu-
ally identical: The carrying out of some movement to produce
a particular sensory event, only that we emphasize the
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produced event when calling this process perception and em-
phasize the way we produced it when calling it action.
The second general assumption acknowledges the neuro-
scientific insight that human brains do not code complex
events in terms of separable symbols, but rather through dis-
tributed neural codes that are sensitive, and often selectively
sensitive, to particular features of the event. For instance, the
visual cortex is known to consist of a larger number of feature
maps, which consist of neurons that code particular values of
some common underlying dimension, such as the orientation,
color, or motion direction of a given stimulus event (DeYoe &
Van Essen, 1988). Feature-based representations have also
been demonstrated for other sensory modalities (Saenz &
Langers, 2014) and for movement parameters (i.e., perceiv-
able and producible action features: Georgopoulos, 1990;
Kalaska & Hyde, 1985), and thus seem to reflect a general
characteristic of representations in the human (or primate)
cortex (Von der Malsburg, 1999).
The third general assumption, which refers to earlier in-
sights from Heider (1926/1959) and Brunswick (1944), de-
rives from the conclusion that perceptual events and actions
can be related to each other in terms of the distal events they
refer to (e.g., the distance a hand should travel should fit with
the perceived distance between the hand and a cup one intends
to reach before starting the movement) but differ drastically
with respect to their proximal codes (e.g., the neural firing
pattern representing the distance in the visual system and the
firing pattern representing the to-be-traveled distance in the
motor cortex; Prinz, 1992). In other words, perception and
action can effectively communicate only if their language re-
fers to features of the external world but not to the features of
the codes representing these external features. Accordingly,
the common currency of representations involved in percep-
tion and action need to be distal features.
Specific assumptions
The five more specific assumptions of TEC refer to: (a) the
multimodal nature of event features, (b) the activation and
integration of feature codes, (c) the attentional/intentional
modulation of event coding, (d) the roles of event codes (event
files), and (e) the architecture of event representations. The
first assumption directly follows from distal coding. If what
it refers to in the external world is more important for a feature
code than how this external information is registered and
proximally coded, it must not care about the modality or the
source of a particular information – if it only co-varies with the
represented state of affairs in the world. In representing the
greenness of things in the world, we are likely to take the
activation of neurons in the color map of our visual cortex into
account but may also consider the particular emotional state
that green things may invoke in us, the memories green things
might retrieve, the Gibsonian affordance greenness might
provide, and so forth. Hence, over time and experience every
event reflecting the Bgreenish^ portion of the light’s wave-
length will become represented by all the internal activities
that systematically accompany (i.e., are strongly correlated
with) the exposure to green things. This implies that the fea-
ture code GREEN is a type of concept in the sense of Feldman
Barrett (2017), as it can be considered an internal construction
of some external fact rather than a one-on-one translation of
some objectively existing fact into internal activity (a
cha rac t e r i za t ion tha t wou ld app ly to prox imal
representations; see Heider, 1926/1959).
The second assumption makes a distinction between the
activation of a feature code, such as the increase of activation
of the GREEN code when seeing an apple, and the integration
of multiple activated codes, such as the code GREEN with
other apple-related codes like ROUND, EDIBLE, and
GRASPABLE. Logically, activation sets in before integration
can take place, which has important implications for
predicting the effects of one perceived or planned event on
the perception or planning of other events. While feature
codes are activated but not yet bound, they tend to prime all
representations that include this particular feature code – for
example, seeing something green facilitates saying Bgreen,^
and vice versa. Once a feature code is bound into a more
integral event file (a network of feature codes), whether it be
when perceiving or planning the production of an event, it
interferes with the perception or planning of other, feature-
overlapping events (Stoet & Hommel, 1999, 2002).
The third assumption considers the contribution of each
feature code to the representation of an event. Codes of fea-
tures on a dimension that is (assumed to be) relevant for the
presently relevant task will have a stronger impact on
representing an event then codes of features related to current-
ly irrelevant dimensions – the intentional weighting principle
(Memelink &Hommel, 2013). For instance, in a task in which
the two possible stimuli or responses mainly differ in horizon-
tal location, stimuli and responses are more likely to be coded
in terms of left and right than in a task in which stimuli and
responses differ on non-spatial dimensions.
The fourth assumption refers to the roles that feature or
event files can play. In principle, each code can represent
either stimuli or responses or both (the common coding prin-
ciple). This means that stimulus and response codes do not
differ in type or format, but only with respect to the role they
play in a particular situation or task.
The fifth and final assumption refers to the architecture of
event representations. Feature codes are assumed to be
grounded in sensorimotor experience; this is where they come
from and the process through which they emerge. This is true
for features that are related to physical dimensions of external
events, such as form and color, features related to one’s own
body – such as kinesthetic and tactile feelings accompanying a
movement, features related to actions – such as grasping or
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throwing (thus creating Gibsonian affordances like
GRASPABLE and THROWABLE), and features related to
the affective response one has to an event, given that these
are merely interpretations of perceived interoceptive activity
(Feldman Barrett, 2017; James, 1884). Given that each of
these features might become associated with other features
for reasons that are unrelated to the respective event (e.g., by
learning that GREEN commonly implies FRESH), the expe-
rience of an event might be accompanied by the activation of
features that are not directly given by the experienced event.
Moreover, perceptual and action learning are likely to result in
event representations that are more complex and more inte-
grative than the one-shot event examples I have given so far.
The Theory of Event Coding V2.0
Since its development in the late 1990s, TEC has inspired
numerous studies on the interaction between perception and
action. In contrast to earlier information-processing models of
stimulus-response compatibility, TEC not only accounted for
compatibility effects of various kinds but also allowed for the
interpretation of phenomena like imitation and mimicry
(Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000), effects of
action planning on perception (Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz,
2007; Müsseler & Hommel, 1997), sequential effects of stim-
ulus and response coding (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004;
Spapé & Hommel, 2008), and interactions between concur-
rently planned actions (Stoet & Hommel, 1999). Some of
these effects were successfully modeled in computational ver-
sions of TEC (Haazebroek, Raffone, & Hommel, 2017;
Kachergis, Wyatte, O'Reilly, de Kleijn, & Hommel, 2014),
neuroscientific studies have uncovered some of the neural
underpinnings of TEC-related processes (Elsner et al., 2002;
Kühn, Keizer, Colzato, Rombouts, & Hommel, 2011a; Kühn,
Keizer, Rombouts, & Hommel, 2011b), and developmental
studies have investigated the acquisition of TEC-related
knowledge structures (for a brief review, see Verschoor &
Hommel, 2017). In the following, I would like to review some
of the most recent developments of TEC, as they expand the
scope of the theory and their application significantly. Note
that these new developments, and the theoretical additions
they resulted in, are not meant to replace the original TEC
1.0, but rather to provide theoretical add-ons that specify or
modulate the representations and mechanisms introduced by
the original version. In other words, TEC 2.0 fully includes
TEC 1.0, which is why the following discussion concentrates
on the new features of TEC 2.0.
The Control of Event Coding
Adopting the ideomotor idea that actions are integrated with
and represented by codes of their perceptual effects – and
assuming that these effects are represented in terms of feature
codes – allows TEC to model the representations of actions in
the same way as Kahneman, Treisman, and Gibbs (1992) have
modeled the representations of perceived events. These au-
thors have pointed out that the fact that perceptual events are
represented by neural activity that is distributed across wide
areas of the cortex requires some sort of integration. Indeed,
the cortex of humans and other primates is known to code
various features of perceived events in dedicated feature maps,
such as color- and shape-specific maps in the visual cortex
code and frequency-specific maps in the auditory cortex. In
an environment that consists of more than one object at a time,
the brain thus needs to determine which of the various neural
activities belong to the same event – the notorious binding
problem (Treisman, 1996). While there is no consensus with
respect to the question of how the binding problem is neurally
resolved, a large body of evidence suggests that people do
bind features of the same event together. For instance, the
facilitation of letter naming by presenting the to-be-named
letter before is enhanced if the present and previous letter
appeared as part of the same object (Kahneman et al., 1992).
Along the same lines, repeating a visual, auditory, or tactile
feature of an event facilitates performance on the repeated
feature only if other features also repeat (Hommel, 1998) –
otherwise facilitation turns into interference (the partial-
repetition cost). Assuming that action plans are represented
in the same way as are perceived events suggests that feature
binding may not be restricted to classical perceptual features
but also extend to action features (as according to TEC they
are perceptual features of the same right and nature). Indeed,
numerous studies have shown that partial-repetition costs can
also be demonstrated for combinations of stimulus and re-
sponse features (Hommel, 1998) and for combinations of ac-
tion features belonging to different action plans (Stoet &
Hommel, 1999). Hence, people bind features of perceived
events, of intentionally performed actions, and across percep-
tion and action.
If feature binding serves the purpose of organizing neural
activity belonging to different external events, one would ex-
pect that features are bound rather automatically, that is, irre-
spective of current goals and intentions and irrespective of the
need or use of binding these features. The same conclusion is
suggested by ideomotor theorizing, which implies that actions
and their perceptual effects are bound spontaneously, and long
before these bindings are used for intentional action planning
(Verschoor & Hommel, 2017). However, first observations
from feature-repetition-priming studies seemed to suggest a
different picture. For instance, Hommel (1998) had partici-
pants carry out actions in response to either shape or color
features. Repetitions of the task-relevant stimulus feature al-
ways strongly interacted with repetitions of the response: if
shape was relevant, performance was better if both shape and
response were repeated or if both alternated, as compared to
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the partial-repetition conditions (i.e., if shape was repeated
and response alternated or vice versa), and if color was rele-
vant, it was color and response repetition that strongly
interacted. The task-irrelevant feature (color in the first and
shape in the second example) also showed some interaction
with response repetition, but that was always weaker and
sometimes non-significant. These and related observations
made me think that feature dimensions might be weighted
according to their task-relevance, in such a way that features
of task-relevant dimensions might induce a stronger activation
than features of task-irrelevant dimensions, and that only fea-
tures passing a particular integration threshold would become
integrated into event files (Hommel, 2004). In other words,
feature binding might be selective, and depending on task
goals, more selective than feature-integration and ideomotor
accounts seem to suggest.
However, considering the nature of feature-repetition-
priming studies, this is not a necessary conclusion. If the rep-
etition effects of two features interact, one needs to assume
that (a) the codes of these two features were bound during or
as a consequence of the previous presentation, and (b) the
created binding is retrieved by re-viewing at least one of the
integrated features. If no significant effect is obtained, howev-
er, or if that effect is weakened, this may be because no or less
binding occurred on the first presentation, because no retrieval
took place on the second, or both. In other words, a lesser or
absent effect need not indicate lesser or absent feature binding,
but may rather point to an effect on binding retrieval.
Interestingly, converging evidence points rather consistent-
ly to retrieval, rather than to binding, as the cause of selectiv-
ity. For instance, partial-repetition costs for task-relevant di-
mensions are less pronounced in individuals with high fluid
intelligence (Colzato, van Wouwe, Lavender, & Hommel,
2006a) and in young adults, as compared to children and older
adults (Hommel, Kray, & Lindenberger, 2011), and more pro-
nounced in children with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD;
Zmigrod, de Sonneville, Colzato, Swaab, & Hommel, 2013).
If partial-repetition costs really reflect feature binding, this
pattern is the opposite of what one would expect: if anything,
subpopulations that have been suspected to have greater diffi-
culties in integrating information (like individuals low in fluid
intelligence, children and older adults, and patient suffering
from ASD) should show smaller, rather than larger, binding
effects. However, if one takes partial-repetition costs to indi-
cate retrieval, the obtained pattern would make sense: Note
that the task neither requires nor rewards the retrieval of pre-
vious bindings, suggesting that reduced effects indicate better
control over information retrieval. Given that such control
should indeed be more effective in individuals with high fluid
intelligence and in healthy, young adults, the obtained out-
comes would be more intuitive.
More direct evidence for a role of retrieval was provided by
a study in which the task-relevance of stimulus features was
systematically varied in time. As in typical feature-repetition
studies (e.g., Hommel, 1998), participants were presented
with pairs of stimulus-response combinations: they were cued
to respond to the first stimulus (S1) by a particular response
(R1), so that neither the shape nor the color of S1 mattered,
and would then see another stimulus (S2), the shape or color
of which would indicate the second response (R2). As usual, it
was expected that repeating or alternating both stimulus shape
and response and repeating alternating both stimulus color and
response would yield better performance than repeating the
stimulus feature while alternating the response, or vice versa
(the partial-repetition cost). However, which feature dimen-
sion of S2 would indicate R2 (shape or color) was signaled
either before or after the presentation of S1. If the dimensional
cue appeared before the presentation of S1, the binding of S1
and R1 features would thus occur under the attentional set that
this cue would indicate. If this binding is selective, the
resulting partial-repetition costs should be stronger for repeti-
tions of the cued feature dimension and the response than for
the non-cued feature dimension and the response. If the di-
mensional cue appears after S1 presentation, however, S1-R1
binding should be under the influence of the attentional set
that was relevant in the previous trial. Interestingly, the time
point at which the dimensional cue was presented did not
matter, suggesting that it is not the creation of bindings that
is affected by the attentional set, but rather binding retrieval.
This also fits results from two neurofeedback studies, which
showed that training participants in increasing gamma-
frequency-band activation of their frontal cortex reduces
partial-repetition costs for task-irrelevant feature dimensions
but not for the task-relevant feature dimension (Keizer,
Verment, & Hommel, 2010b; Keizer, Verschoor, Verment, &
Hommel, 2010a). The outcome pattern suggests that the train-
ing promoted the gamma-based top-down control of episodic
memory by the frontal cortex, which in turn sharpened retriev-
al by increasing the focus to task-relevant features.
Taken altogether, the available evidence suggests that cre-
ating event files is an automatic process that binds features of
perceived events, of intentional action plans, and of combina-
tions thereof. However, people are able to selectively retrieve
previously created event files when encountering one or more
of the features they contain. The degree to which they can
differ between individuals varies, but these differences can
be reduced through training.
The metacontrol of event coding
Traditional approaches to human action control still follow the
pioneer of will psychology, Narziss Ach (1910, 1935), in try-
ing to understand the nature of cognitive control by studying
how and under which circumstances it manages to overcome
overlearned habits. To that end, Ach had developed a method
to experimentally induce particular habits by having
Atten Percept Psychophys (2019) 81:2139–2154 2143
participants carry out one kind of cognitive operation on a set
of stimuli (Hommel, 2000), such as responding to nonsense
syllables by producing a corresponding rhyming response
(e.g., zup➔tup), for weeks before having them apply another
operation, such as exchanging the first and second consonant
(zup➔puz). As predicted, participants were slower and less
accurate when carrying out the new operations on stimuli that
were previously trained to generate responses that were no
longer correct under the present instruction, as compared to
stimuli from an untrained set. It is easy to recognize the same
logic in currently more popular research designs investigating
cognitive control, such as in studies using the Stroop or Simon
effect, the only exception being that the interfering habit is no
longer under experimental control but assumed to exist be-
forehand. According to the will-against-habit idea underlying
this practice, cognitive control is active and successful to the
degree that the previously acquired habit can be overcome.
Hence, the smaller the Simon/Stroop effect, the stronger one’s
will (also known as Bcognitive control^ or Bexecutive
functions^: e.g., Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014).
While this logic is shared by virtually all current accounts
of cognitive control, it may be too simplistic to capture the true
complexity and adaptivity of human behavior. As has been
argued by Goschke (2003), behavior is unlikely to be adaptive
when shielding the current goal against all possible chal-
lenges: Ignoring task-irrelevant information might be useful
when trying tomeet a paper deadline or persist with one’s diet,
but it can be less useful when encountering a predator or
warrior of a hostile tribe during one’s search for food.
Hence, truly adaptive behavioral control needs to know when
to persist (in pursuing one’s goal) and when to let go (and
become flexible enough to adopt other goals). Recent neuro-
scientific insights suggest that this needed balance between
persistence and flexibility emerges from the interaction be-
tween the mesofrontal and the nigrostriatal dopaminergic
pathway (Cools & d’Esposito, 2010) and/or between receptor
families residing therein (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008).
Another complication stems from the fact that humans
commonly entertain more than one goal: They may well try
to be fast in a laboratory task, but they at the same timewant to
save energy for the upcoming seminar, keep in mind their
shopping list for later, satisfy their economic needs, maintain
their good manners and moral ideals, build their career, etc. It
is unlikely that handing a student a small fee or credit point
and instructing them to carry out what seems to be a rather
nonsensical task will bring all these other goals to a halt. If so,
behavioral control is likely to represent a useful compromise
between all these goals and the information processing style
they suggest. While many goals may not show any obvious
bearing to a Stroop task, say, some are likely to directly impact
performance on it. For instance, recent predictive-coding ap-
proaches (e.g., Pezzulo, Rigoli & Friston, 2018) have revital-
ized the idea that humans are constantly busy with predicting
upcoming events and try to improve their predictions when-
ever they fail – a renaissance of the approaches of Berlyne
(1949, 1960) and Sokolov (1963). If true, this suggests that
people are particularly interested in uncertain stimuli, such as
the commonly randomly chosen color words of Stroop stim-
uli. Thus while these words are not relevant and actually rep-
resent a hinderance for optimally performing the goal in the
Stroop task, they should be highly relevant for a brain that is
particularly interested in difficult-to-predict stimuli. Indeed,
interference from nominally task-irrelevant stimulus features
is drastically reduced or eliminated if these features become
predictable (Frings, Merz, & Hommel, 2019).
These and other considerations (see Hommel, 2015b) sug-
gest that adaptive control tries to find a balance between goal-
shielding persistence and (less shielding or even goal-
sacrificing) flexibility (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) by sys-
tematically biasing one’s style of information processing ac-
cordingly. Elsewhere (Hommel, 2015b; Hommel & Wiers,
2017) I have suggested that this is achieved by modulating
(a) the degree to which the current goal(s) bias decision-
making by supporting goal-compatible choice alternatives,
and (b) the degree to which representations of such alterna-
tives compete with each other. Under a persistence bias, the
top-down support through goal representations and the mutual
competition would be strong, but both would be weak under a
flexibility bias. Among other things, this claim suggests the
existence of interindividual and intraindividual differences in
control style. Indeed, genetic predispositions that have been
assumed to make the frontal persistence system more efficient
improve performance on persistence-heavy tasks, such as
Stroop-like conflict tasks, but not on flexibility-sensitive inte-
gration tasks, such as the attentional-blink task (Hommel &
Colzato, 2017a), while predispositions supporting the effi-
ciency of the striatal flexibility system have the opposite ef-
fect. Along the same lines, cultural factors propagating indi-
vidualistic mindsets were shown to be associated with better
performance in persistence-heavy tasks than factors propagat-
ing collectivistic mindsets, while the opposite was found for
flexibility-heavy tasks (Hommel & Colzato, 2017a).
Intraindividual differences were also obtained. For instance,
meditation of the focused-attention kind (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne
& Davidson, 2008) were found to improve persistence-heavy
tasks, while meditation of the open-monitoring kind was re-
ported to improve performance in flexibility-heavy tasks
(Hommel & Colzato, 2017b).
To summarize, event coding takes place under a particular
metacontrol mode, which can vary between extreme persis-
tence and extreme flexibility. Persistence is characterized by a
strong impact of the current goal and strong mutual competi-
tion between alternative decisions, while flexibility is charac-
terized by a weak impact of the current goal and weak com-
petition. As a consequence, a persistence bias facilitates dis-
crimination between alternative events (as the underlying
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event files compete more in a winner-takes-all fashion) and
cognitive/behavioral exploitation, while a flexibility bias fa-
cilitates integration and cognitive/behavioral exploration
(Hommel, 2015b).
Binding and learning
Event files can be considered episodic snapshots of particular
feature combinations that are maintained over some time. The
creation and maintenance of event files is thought to address
the binding problem by organizing feature-based information
in an event-specific way. But what happens if the event is
over? Studies tapping into action-effect integration suggest
that event files are maintained for at least the duration of an
experimental session, and the theoretical assumption is that
they are stored even longer (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). This
raises the question of how binding and the short-term integra-
tion of feature codes are related to long-term memory. More
specifically, Logan (1988) has suggested that the acquisition
of cognitive skills proceeds by storing instances of episodic
experiences, which raises the question of whether the concepts
of event file and of instance are related or even identical.
Interestingly, the available empirical evidence suggests that
the answer is yes and no.
Colzato, Raffone, and Hommel (2006b) set up a study that
directly contrasted the effects of binding and learning on per-
formance. A feature-repetition design was used in which the
shape and color of a visual stimulus repeated or alternated
orthogonally. As in previous studies, repeating or alternating
both features yielded better performance than repeating one
but alternating the other – the partial-repetition cost. However,
two of the four possible combinations of shape and color were
much more frequent than the other two. This produced a main
effect of frequency, so that performance was better for the
more frequent combinations. Importantly, however, this effect
did not interact with the partial-repetition cost, suggesting that
binding was independent from learning. Further experiments
with already overlearned feature combinations (like yellow
bananas and red strawberries as compared to red bananas
and yellow strawberries) showed the same independence,
which rules out that it might reflect limited experience.
These findings were fully replicated in a later study by
Hommel and Colzato (2009), who suggested a dual-process
account: Repeated experience of particular feature combina-
tions results in a long-term memory trace (perhaps a Loganian
instance) that interacts with incoming perceptual information.
If, thus, a banana is encountered, the activation of the corre-
sponding shape code may directly prime the associated
YELLOW code, which speeds up processing and responding
to yellow bananas. Independent of this general benefit, how-
ever, the banana shape codewill be just as effectively bound to
a RED code if the currently perceived banana happens to be
red, and it would be bound to the YELLOW code if the
banana is yellow. Hence, the event file that serves for the
online representation of the banana is not identical to the event
file or instance that is kept in memory, even though
reactivating the memory file might activate a code that, in
the absence of conflicting perceptually-derived codes, might
become bound to the online file. This difference between
memory and online file might be related to different neural
mechanisms. While longer-term storage is likely to rely on
structural changes, online binding might rely on neural syn-
chronization (Hommel & Colzato, 2009). It is certainly possi-
ble that bindings are transferred/transformed into memory
traces (e.g., neural synchrony over some time or with some
intensity might induce structural changes), but these traces
operate independently from the bindings (cf., O’Reilly,
Bhattacharyya, Howard, & Ketz, 2014). In other words, bind-
ing might lead to, but is not identical to, learning, which in
turn implies that event files are not (just) but might become
instances (or memory event files).
To summarize, there is evidence that online feature binding
is not directly supported by stored knowledge, even though
activated memory codes may well become integrated into on-
line feature binding (as the fifth specific assumption of TEC
1.0 implies). At this point, it remains unclear whether and
exactly how online feature bindings are transformed into more
durable memory event files. In other words, more research on
the relationship between binding and learning is wanted.
The coding of social events
The original aim of TEC was to account for interactions be-
tween perception and action that unidirectional stage models
were unable to explain. The situations in which such interac-
tions were studied inside and outside the lab were commonly
non-social in nature: some stimuli facilitated some actions
more than others and some actions increased sensitivity to
some stimuli more than to others. Even in situations that
included other individuals, such as in imitation studies, the
social aspect was considered to be irrelevant. However,
more and more cognitive researchers became interested in
social situations and asked whether the presence and
characteristics of another person, the actions the person is
performing, and the goals he or she is pursuing might have
an impact on cognitive and behavioral performance. For
instance, Knoblich and Sebanz (2006) claimed that perception
and action are inherently social in nature and that other peo-
ple’s actions and intentions are automatically included in one’s
own situational representation. This in turn raises the question
of how people cognitively represent other individuals and how
they distinguish between themselves and others (e.g., when
taking turns in a cooperative task).
On the one hand, one might find that TEC is simply not
made to account for social effects and leave the theorizing to
dedicatedly social frameworks – and this was, indeed, my first
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reaction to the first more interactive studies. On the other
hand, however, it is difficult to see why a theory that aims to
explain how events are coded should surrender only because a
given event is created by another person and/or involves char-
acteristics that refer to living beings rather than static objects.
Indeed, the ideomotor underpinnings of TEC already include
the aspect of self-perception, which means that the action-
related representational assumptions of TEC are already tap-
ping into aspects of self-representation. These were the rea-
sons to explore whether and how TEC could be extended to
include the coding of social events.
According to Greenwald et al. (2002), concepts of the self
can be considered networks of codes that represent the rele-
vant features that what has been learned possesses. Some of
these features might refer to physical characteristics, such as
the size of one’s body, the color of one’s hair, or the speed of
one’s gait, but others are likely to refer to more abstract char-
acteristics, such as having a particular gender and social status,
being a parent and supervisor, having a particular degree of
intelligence, having particular preferences, etc. TEC can easily
account for the physical features, as coding the size of a hu-
man body should not be any different from coding the size of a
non-living object. However, how about more complex
features?
On the one hand, it is clear that the complexity of a concept
like parenthood requires more than registering a particular
core feature in primary visual cortex. But that also accounts
for concepts related to non-living objects, such as a table or
university. Such concepts rely on more than one feature or a
specific feature combination, i.e., a loosely defined set of fea-
tures and feature combinations that can vary from instance to
instance. On the other hand, however, there is no reason why
such loosely defined feature sets should not be acquired
through sensorimotor experience and eventually become in-
gredients of a continuously growing event-coding system
(Hommel, 2016, 2018): For example, parenthood may be de-
fined by experiences with other adults that play with and care
for a particular infant, feeding and driving a particular adoles-
cent to school, and hosting her on important holidays later on.
Hence, the acquisition of more complex features is likely to
take more time and to consider more information than the
acquisition of simpler features, but there is no theoretical rea-
son why the format of representing simple and complex fea-
tures should differ and why social features should be coded
any differently from nonsocial features. Once Bsocial^ fea-
tures become coded into a person’s representation, encounter-
ing the person, or any cue related to this person, might reacti-
vate the corresponding feature code stored in longer-term
memory-based event files, and this reactivation will allow
the feature to become part of an online event file. For instance,
if a particular person has been known to show aggressive,
attacking behavior in the past, encountering the person is like-
ly to reactivate aggression-related codes even if such behavior
is currently not shown, thereby preparing the perceiver to deal
with the possible occurrence of this behavior.
The coding of self
TEC does not distinguish between representing oneself and
other individuals, so that representing oneself basically fol-
lows the same scenario as representing someone else.
However, as discussed elsewhere (Hommel, 2018), the fact
that a given perceiver-actor has more direct access to more
information than he or she has about others introduces three
important differences between self- and other-representation.
First, perceiving oneself and others is likely to be more
similar with respect to information collected through extero-
ceptive perceptual channels, like vision, audition, tactition,
and olfaction, than with respect to information collected
through interoceptive channels, like proprioception and affec-
tive states. This is likely to make self-related representations
more comprehensive and more strongly colored by codes de-
rived from interoception, including affect.
Second, given that event files can also include (codes that
can trigger) motor activity, the representation of one’s own
actions is likely to be richer and more Bmotoric^ than the
representation of another person’s actions. However, this dis-
crepancy depends on the degree to which self and other are
sharing event-specific action information: if, say, an experi-
enced ballet dancer is observing another ballet dancer, the
perceptual input is likely to reactivate the same interoceptive
and motor codes that the observed dancer uses to code her
own action.
Third, the sensory consequences of one’s own actions are
commonly easier to predict than the consequences of other
people’s actions, again suggesting that representing oneself
is likely to be based on richer information and more accurate
predictions than representing someone else. However, this
discrepancy again depends on self-other overlap and the de-
gree of shared history; it will thus be much smaller in the case
of the two experienced ballet dancers than in the case of two
strangers meeting for the first time, especially if they come
from different cultural backgrounds.
Summary of novel contributions of TEC 2.0
As already mentioned, TEC 2.0 leaves the original 1.0 version
fully intact but provides a number of important specifications
and extensions that strongly enhance the scope of the theory.
First, it distinguishes between the control of the actual binding
process – that is, the integration of currently available and
memory-based, reactivated features into online event files –
and the control of the retrieval or reactivation of a just-created
online event file. The available evidence suggests that the
binding process is rather non-selective with respect to current
goals, and thus integrates all feature codes that are currently
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activated, for whatever reason. In contrast, the retrieval or
reactivation process seems to be very selective in restricting
retrieval/reactivation to codes that currently are or that the
individual believes to be task-relevant. Second, the handling
and especially the retrieval/reactivation of event files is
governed by current metacontrol states, which can vary from
extreme persistence (implying high selectivity and focus) to
extreme flexibility (implying the opposite). Third, online
bindings and memorized networks of feature codes can be
shown to have separable effects, but it remains unclear wheth-
er and how online feature bindings are transformed into more
durable event representations. Fourth, social and non-social
events are claimed to be coded the same way, by means of
the same representational logic. This also holds for the repre-
sentation of oneself, which, however, may often be richer than
the representations of others.
Integration and application
We have seen that the original TEC has been extended in
various directions by adding assumptions about how sim-
ple and complex event files are created, handled, and
retrieved, and transformed into more enduring traces. In
the following, I attempt to make these extensions more
transparent by applying them to variations of the Simon
task and the effects these variations generate, starting
with the classical task and ending with the joint Simon
task that is carried out by two individuals. I also try to
show how the extended TEC can account for observa-
tions that might look very confusing and divergent at
first sight and that are difficult to understand from other
theoretical positions.
The Simon effect
The effect first reported by Simon and Rudell (1967) is widely
used in the cognitive sciences because of its simplicity and its
interesting theoretical implications (Hommel, 2011). The ba-
sic setup needed to obtain a Simon effect consists of two
stimuli that randomly appear on the left and right side of some
reference point, such as a fixation cross in the middle of a
screen, and two responses that are defined by their horizontal
location. While stimulus location is instructed to be task-irrel-
evant, a non-spatial feature of the stimulus, such as color or
shape, signals correct responding. In the example given in Fig.
1, participants respond to black stimuli by pressing a left key
and to white stimuli by pressing a right key. Notwithstanding
the task-irrelevance of stimulus location, responses are com-
monly found to be faster and more accurate if the stimulus
happens to spatially correspond to the response key (the com-
patible or congruent condition) than if the stimulus appears on
the side of the currently incorrect response key (the incompat-
ible or incongruent condition) – the Simon effect.
TEC accounts for this effect by assuming that stimuli acti-
vate the task-specific event files to the degree that they
feature-overlap with them. As shown in Fig. 1, the left re-
sponse in our example task might be represented by feature
codes referring to the left hand that is being used, the index
finger that is being moved, the left key that is being pressed,
the high speed of the response, and the black color of the
relevant stimulus (more features are likely to be coded but
Fig. 1. Representing left and right response events in a typical Simon
task. Black and white squares are assigned to left and right key presses,
respectively. Presenting the black square will activate the event file for the
left response, which eventually is carried out. The instruction is couched
in terms of key location, which renders this feature task-relevant in which
increases the intentional weighting for key-location features. Hand loca-
tion and other features are rendered irrelevant and are not or are only
weakly weighted (shown only for hand location). Coding the location
of the stimulus as RIGHT will activate the corresponding feature codes
(right hand and right key in the example), which will spread to the other
feature codes of the same event file to the degree that their intentional
weight is sufficiently high. As a consequence, this event file will be a
stronger competitor in response selection and, in the given example, slow
down the selection of the left response or even result in performing the
(incorrect) right response
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not essential for the explanation). The left response also con-
tains the motor pattern needed to trigger the left response (not
shown in the example), so that a sufficient activation of the
left-response event file will lead to the execution of the left
response. Along these lines, the right response might be rep-
resented by feature codes referring to the right hand, the index
finger, the speed of the response, and the white color of the
stimulus. If the black stimulus now appears on the right side of
the screen, it will activate the event file of the left response by
activating the black feature code that is bound to the represen-
tation of the left response. However, it will also activate the
event file of the right response by activating the LEFT codes
referring to the right hand and the right key, which in turn
creates a response conflict that needs more time to resolve.
This would not be the case if the black stimulus appeared on
the left side, because it would then feature-overlap with the
representation of the left response only and thus not create any
response conflict.
While a pure event-file approach would suffice to ac-
count for the basic Simon effect, it fails to account for
some of its variations. For instance, a Simon effect is also
be observed if the left and right key are operated with two
fingers of the same hand (Heister, Ehrenstein &
Schroeder-Heister, 1986) or, as in crossed-arm studies,
operated by the index fingers of the contra-lateral hand
(Wallace, 1971). This suggests that the left and right re-
sponse is mainly or exclusively coded in terms of the
location of the key being pressed but not of the effector
being used. To account for effects of that sort, TEC as-
sumes that some features representing a particular event
can receive a higher weight than others, either because
their salience suggests so or because the respective feature
dimension is directly or indirectly task-irrelevant. In the
Simon task, the most salient difference between left and
right responses is the location of the key being pressed
(which, in the standard setup, is perfectly confounded
with the location and the anatomical status of the active
effector) and this location is also commonly used to refer
to the responses in the instruction. This renders key loca-
tion more task-relevant than hand location, say, which is
indicated in Fig. 1 by the stronger coloring of the key-
related goal criterion. Task-relevance leads to the higher
intentional weighting of the corresponding features, as
also indicated in the figure. As a consequence, the corre-
spondence between the task stimulus and the key location
will matter more than correspondence between stimulus
and hand or finger location, which accounts for the avail-
able findings from crossed-arm studies.
The inverted Simon effect
An even more important role of goal criterion and intentional
weighting was demonstrated by Hommel (1993). This study
actually used high- and low-pitched tones instead of black and
white colors, but here I translate tones into colors for the sake
of consistency. In one condition, pressing a left key would
flash a light on the right side, while a right key would flash
of light on the left side, as indicated in Fig. 2. This setup
allowed instructing one group of participants in terms of key
location (e.g., Bpress the left key if the black stimulus
appears^) and another group in terms of flash location (Bflash
the right light if the black stimulus appears^). With key in-
struction, the goal criterion should be defined in terms of key
location, so that (in addition to the impact of its color) a
Fig. 2. The processes leading to the inversion of the Simon effect. Left
and right response events are basically coded as shown in Fig. 1, with two
exceptions. First, the fact that the left response triggers a right light flash
and the right response triggers a left light flash is represented by including
the corresponding flash-location codes in the respective event files.
Second, the fact that participants are instructed in terms of flash location
rather than key location implies a change in goal criteria and a change in
intentional weighting, which now increases the impact of flash-location
codes and reduces the impact of key-location or hand-location codes.
Coding the location of the stimulus as RIGHT will activate the flash-
location (right flash in the example), which will spread to the other feature
codes of the same event file. As a consequence, this event file will be a
stronger competitor and response selection and, in the given example,
speed up the selection of the left response
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stimulus appearing on the left should mainly activated the left
response and the stimulus appearing on the right the right
response, thus producing a standard Simon effect. With flash
instruction, however, the goal criterion should be in terms of
flash location, as indicated in the Fig. 2. As a consequence, a
left stimulus should mainly activate the event file representing
the right response while a right stimulus should activate the
file representing the left response. In other words, the Simon
effect should be inverted with this instruction, which is exactly
what was found.
The Go-Nogo Simon effect
The main contribution of processing-stage approaches to un-
derstanding the Simon and related stimulus-response compat-
ibility effects consisted in the localization of the problem that
these effects are thought to reflect in the processing chain.
According to these approaches, response selection is the cul-
prit: incompatible stimuli are thought to automatically activate
the incorrect response, which results in response conflict that
takes time to resolve (e.g., Kornblum et al., 1990). While TEC
comes to the same conclusion, stage models did not provide
any insight into why the automatic activation might occur but
merely took this process for granted. Moreover, stage models
face difficulties if it comes to accounting for findings obtained
with Go-Nogo versions of the Simon task. Such a version is
obtained by eliminating one of the two responses, for example
by instructing participants to press the left key whenever a
black stimulus appears. From a stage perspective, this would
eliminate the need to select the response, so that the Simon
effect should disappear (i.e., the left response should be as fast
and accurate for left as for right stimuli). Indeed, this is what
has been obtained in various studies (for a review, see
Hommel, 1996), especially if response location was blocked
overmany trials. However, a significant Simon effect has been
reported from studies in which participants often switch be-
tween left and right responses (Hommel, 1995, 1996). As such
switches were always predictable and allowed for sufficient
preparation, stage models are unable to account for the obtain-
ed effects. In contrast, TEC suggests that the presence of an
alternative event in the same or a similar context introduces
the need to distinguish between the available events. Given
that location (be it hand, finger, or key location) is the most
obvious discriminative feature between left and right response
events, it makes sense to assume that the corresponding fea-
ture code, such as the key-location code in the example, is
active to the degree that discrimination is necessary. As this
should be the case as the frequency of switching increases and,
thus, the recency of the alternative event decreases, frequent
switching should indeed introduce at least a small Simon ef-
fect (Fig. 3).
The joint Simon effect
Recent years have seen a steadily increasing interest in situa-
tions that involve more than a single individual working in a
dedicated lab, and the joint Simon task has enjoyed particular
attention in developing research designs consisting of multiple
individuals working on the same task. Sebanz, Knoblich, and
Prinz (2003) were the first to have two participants share the
same Simon task. Distributing the task over to people turns the
original binary-choice task into a Go-Nogo task: one partici-
pant operates the left key in response to one stimulus feature
(black in my example) and the other participant operates the
Fig. 3. The (left in this case) response in a Go/Nogo Simon task. The
participant responds to black stimuli and ignores white stimuli. There is
no response competition and given that there is only one response, key
location is not task-relevant. Stimulus location will be coded but given the
task-irrelevance of all location-related feature codes, it will not activate
ingredients of the event file to a sufficient degree to have a strong impact
on response selection. As a consequence, no Simon effect will appear.
However, frequently switching between left and right responses intro-
duces a discrimination problem that would call for some degree of acti-
vation of the key-location code or similar codes that allowed to discrim-
inate between the two responses. As a consequence, a small Simon effect
will appear
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right key in response to another feature (white, for example).
From a processing-stage point of view, the presence of the
other individual should not matter, as the correct response
could still be selected and prepared in advance. Hence, no
Simon effect is predicted but, interestingly, significant effects
are obtained when two individuals work side by side (Sebanz
et al., 2003). How is that possible?
Various authors have offered the idea that participants
might co-represent the task of the other person in an automatic
fashion, so that the cognitive representation of the joint task
would not differ much from the representation of the solo
Simon task (e.g., Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). However, such
accounts have been shown to run into various difficulties, as
indicated by evidence that the joint Simon effect can be ob-
tained even if the other participant is replaced by a waving cat
or a ticking metronome (Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt,
2013) and that several important aspects of the other’s task
are not considered by the participant (Yamaguchi, Wall, &
Hommel, 2018). However, if we consider the above-
mentioned evidence that fast switching between alternative
events is sufficient to reintroduce a Simon effect even in a
Go-Nogo task and combine that with the TEC assumption that
actions are represented by their perceptual effects, a non-social
interpretation presents itself. As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, having perceived oneself as carrying out an alternative
action event just recently seems to introduce the need to dis-
criminate that event from the event one is expected to generate
in the present trial(s), with key/finger location being the most
salient feature dimension for the purpose. Given that TEC
assumes that self-produced and other-produced events do
not differ in representational format (but only in the amount
of sensory information and the predictability thereof;
Hommel, 2018), it should not matter much whether one was
producing the alternative event oneself or whether one ob-
served someone else doing that. Accordingly, an obvious ac-
count for the joint Simon effect is that the recent experience of
some other-produced alternative event (irrespective of wheth-
er that is produced by a person or a mechanical agent) has the
same consequences as the experience of producing such an
event oneself – the higher intentional weighting of key/finger
location (Fig. 4), which in turn produces a significant Simon
effect (Dolk et al., 2011).
Modulation of the joint Simon effect
The non-social TEC account of the joint Simon effect assumes
that the difficulty in discriminating between one’s own action
event in a Go-Nogo task and another event leads the agent to
emphasize the discriminative spatial feature of his/her re-
sponse, which in turn increases the Simon effect. The difficul-
ty to discriminate should increase with the saliency of the
other event, which fits with the already mentioned observa-
tions that the joint Simon effect can be induced by non-social
sources of difficult-to-ignore auditory stimulation (Dolk et al.,
2013). However, there are also observations that the joint
Simon effect is modulated by factors that are unrelated to
objective saliency.
For example, Colzato et al. (2012a) compared Taiwanese
practicing Buddhists with Taiwanese atheists in a joint Simon
task. The rationale was motivated by Buddha’s claim that
practicing Buddhist meditation leads one to reduce and even-
tually eliminate the perceived borders between self and other
(Harvey, 2012). If that were true, Buddhist participants should
be facing a greater difficulty in discriminating between their
own action and that of another in a joint Simon tasks, which in
turn should increase the joint Simon effect as compared to
atheists. This was indeed the outcome, suggesting that the
same degree of objective saliency can induce different
degrees of response conflict in people who differ in faith and
lifestyle. In another example, Colzato, de Bruijn, and Hommel
(2012b) had participants to work through tasks drawing atten-
tion to either personal interdependence or personal indepen-
dence (Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002) before working on a joint
Simon task. As expected, interdependence priming resulted in
a more pronounced joint Simon effect, again suggesting that
objective saliency of the alternative event is not the only factor
that determines discrimination difficulty (Fig. 5).
At first sight, the finding that two factors with a very
strong social flavor (faith/lifestyle and interdependence
priming) increase the size of the joint Simon effect seems
to challenge the above-mentioned non-social account.
Indeed, the mechanisms discussed so far are insufficient
to explain how such factors could operate, which brings
us to metacontrol. As explained earlier, metacontrol states
vary between persistence and flexibility, and they do so
within and between individuals. As discussed, people with
individualistic mindsets have been shown to excel in
persistence-heavy tasks while people with collectivistic
mindsets excel in tasks drawing on flexibility. This suggests
that Buddhists, who are actively engaged in increasing the
collectivistic nature of their mindset, are likely to possess a
default metacontrol state that is more biased towards flexi-
bility than the metacontrol state of non-Buddhists. If so, the
Buddhist participants of Colzato et al. (2012a) can be ex-
pected to have more overlap between the representation of
themselves and the representation of their co-actor, which
should have increased the discrimination between their own
response and that of the co-actor. This, in turn, should have
made them rely more on the discriminating spatial feature
of the response than atheists, so that a stronger joint Simon
effect in Buddhists was indeed to be expected. The same
goes for interdependence priming: If interdependence prim-
ing makes people place stronger weights on features they
share with others, self-other overlap should have been in-
creased and, as a consequence, the discriminating spatial
feature should have been emphasized more.
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Note that this last interpretation raises an interesting issue.
In a nutshell, I have suggested that Buddhist and other prac-
tices aiming at a more collectivistic mindset bias metacontrol
states away from persistence and more towards flexibility.
Extreme flexibility is assumed to reduce competition between
alternative codes and, thus, reduce perceptual and representa-
tional discrimination. Should this not also reduce spatial dis-
crimination, which in turn would be expected to reduce, rather
than increase, the joint Simon effect? In principle, this is in-
deed what the theory would predict, were it not that this would
eliminate the only remaining distinction that the highly flexi-
ble participant can rely on to solve the task. This in turn intro-
duces the concept of task-constraints, which we investigated
in a recent study (Mekern, Sjoerds, & Hommel, 2019). The
original idea was that individuals might systematically differ
with respect to their personal biases towards persistence and
flexibility. To reveal such biases, we had participants perform
various tasks that all provided separable measures for the rel-
ative degree of persistence and flexibility (e.g., the number of
trials in which an individual would persist in using the same
letter set in a Scrabble task before requesting a new set). If
personal biases were consistent, one would expect the
persistence/flexibility measures to correlate across tasks,
which, however, was not observed (except for tasks that were
almost identical). Rather, what correlated across tasks was
absolute performance, showing that individuals who excelled
in one task were also likely to be good in another. My col-
leagues and I concluded that the particular tasks being used
Fig. 5. The impact of culture, religion, and mindset on the Joint Simon
effect. Metacontrol modulates the impact of goal criteria on intentional
weighting and the degree of mutual competition between event files.
Individualistic attitudes increase, and collectivistic attitudes decrease
impact and competition. Less competition increases perceived self-other
overlap and, as a consequence, introduces a decision problem: which
event is the correct response? This in turn renders event-discriminating
features task-relevant, with key (or self-) location being the most obvious
choice. As a consequence, key location receives higher intentional
weighting, which in turn increases the joint Simon effect
Fig. 4. The (left in this case) response in a Joint Simon task (where the
right key is operated by another person). The participant responds to black
stimuli and ignores white stimuli. The presence of another event (here, the
responses of the other individual) makes it necessary to distinguish
between one’s own responses and this other event. Key location (or
self-location which is confounded here) are likely to serve as the most
salient distinguishing feature dimension, and so the key-location feature
receives high intentional weighting. Accordingly, response competition is
reintroduced and left stimuli will facilitate and right stimuli interfere with
selecting the correct response
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put such strong constraints on relative persistence and flexi-
bility that participants could not afford to express the biases
that were previously demonstrated in tasks with arguably few-
er constraints (cf., Hommel & Colzato, 2017a). The correla-
tions therefore did not reflect such biases, but, rather, the ad-
aptivity of participants in adjusting metacontrol to the task
requirements. Along these lines, I speculate that our
Buddhist participants would indeed show reduced spatial dis-
crimination in tasks that do not necessarily require such dis-
crimination, but failed to do so in a joint Simon task because
the task constraints do not only require some degree of dis-
crimination (so to solve the task at all), but also strongly favor
spatial over other kinds of discrimination. Clearly, more re-
search is needed to test these speculations and, given their
particularly salient spatial nature, Simon-like tasks will be
unlikely to be the most suitable tool to provide such a test.
Desiderata
The original TEC has received broad support from behav-
ioral, neuroscientific, and modelling studies, and stimulat-
ed various new research lines. The extension of TEC in
terms of control functions and representational scope has
further increased its applicability, which now includes
complex tasks and social, perhaps even sociological, phe-
nomena. And yet, much more work needs to be done to
fully exploit the theory’s potential. For one, it seems im-
portant and useful to better understand diagnosing
metacontrol states. As long as instruments to diagnose
such states in terms of relative persistence or flexibility
independent of the performance characteristics that these
states are thought to explain are not available, the danger
of circular explanation remains. A first step would be to
use different tasks for diagnosing the current state and for
testing its impact, but even more independent behavioral
indicators, neurophysiological correlates, or model-
derived parameters would be extremely useful. For anoth-
er, reconstructing more and more social phenomena in
order to reveal their cognitive underpinnings would make
it easier to apply TEC to them. This will often require
stripping social-psychological descriptions of these phe-
nomena from their phenomenological overhead. For in-
stance, while dozens of Bcognitively rich^ definitions of
trust or conformity exist, it seems possible to reduce their
essence to predictability and self-other overlap (Hommel
& Colzato, 2015; Kim & Hommel, 2015), which allows
for various TEC-based predictions that are likely to stim-
ulate novel research lines.
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